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Chapter I
AHGLO-RUSSIAff RIVALRIES IU PERSIa BEFORE 1907
In order properly to understand the policy pursued by Sir
Edward Grey with respect to Persia during the decade before the
outbreak of the Great European War, it is necessary to review the
events of the half century preceding the signing of the Anglo-Russian
Agreement of 1907. There were many forces and factors at work dur-
ing this time which had some bearing and influence on the shaping of
his policy. Russia and Great Britain were rivals in Persia, both
commercially and politically, and the rivalry had become very bitter
at the time Sir Edward Grey became foreign minister. The most im-
portant of the events, which brought about the strained relations
between these two nations in Persian affairs, may be summarized
quite briefly.
Since the year 1800, and even before, England, of all the
European nations, had a predominating influence in Persia, both
commercially and politically. This power had been threatened only
once or twice by France; Russian influence was relatively unim-
1
portant. Russia, it is urue, had been at war with Persia and had
taken some of her territory by conquest; the Czar had also added to
his territories by repeated conquests in Turkestan. But Russia did
not stand very high in the favor of the Persians. Russian influence
1
Curzon, Persia
.
II, 588-593.

8did not become very powerful until after 1890.
The British, however, had managed to keep the good will
of the Persians to a greater or less degree, in spite of the faot
that England had opposed Persia in the seoond Afghan War in 1856-
I
1857, and had carried off the victory. Persia was utterly defeated,
hut England granted terms in the treaty of peace which seemed quite
lenient to the Shah, who had "been expecting that an indemnity would
be demanded. The result was that Persia again became more kindly
disposed toward British interests. During the next thirty years
some advance in facilitating commerce and business was made largely
thru British help and encouragement. In short there was an awaken-
ing on a smell scale; one more of the unpr ogressive countries of
the East adopted some of the methods of the progressive West. In
1864, the first telegraph line was constructed for local messages
only, and in 1872, when England negotiated a third Telegraphic Con-
3
vention with Persia, a system of three wires was arranged for, two
of them for international messages. The construction of these lines
was under the direction of the British Government, which also fur-
nished the material. The British Government had also influenced
the Government of the Shah to abolish the slave tirade, and English
men-of-war had aided in the suppression of this nefarious business
in the Persian Gulf; this campaign had been very successful. It
ft
Sykes, a History of Persia
,
II, 450-455.
3
British and foreign State Papers
,
LY, £6-30; LVIII, 18-
19; LXII, 262-266; .lXXVIII, 11-12. See also Sykes, op_. cit. 473.

was to some extent the result of British pressure that the Karun
River was opened, in 1888, for navigation by vessels of all nations
4
as far as Ahwaz. The following year, Baron de Reuter, an English
subject, was granted a concession by the Shah for the founding of a
bank, which was soon started under the name of Imperial Bank of
Persia, ana xn a few years became a successful and useful institu-
tion.
Thus in 1890, the prestige of Great Britain was asoendant.
But Russia had become aware of the possibilities of Persia as a
commercial field and was now making a systematic attempt to win and
encourage Persian trade. It is even said that bounties were given
5
to Russian traders to encourage commerce. Many writers and offi-
cials of England also feared that Russia was aiming at the peaceful
penetration of Persia, their ultimate aim being to secure a port
6
on the Persian Gulf, Yet in 1890, England still outranked Russia
7
in commerce and influence. In a comparison made by Lord Curzon
of Anglo-Persian and Russo-Persia trade for the year 1889, it was
shown that the total annual value of Persian trade with India and
4
British State Papers
,
1XXIX, 781. Sykes, 0£. oit . , 477.
Lord Curzon, 0£. ci
t
. ,
333, speaks of French attempts to secure
exclusive commercial rights on the Karun River, The concession
seoured, largely thru British negotiation, opened the river to
navigation for ships of all nations.
5
Y/higham, The Persian Problem
,
35E, 354.
6
Colquhoun, Russia Against India
, 176, 181, 182, £30.
7
Curzon, op . oit . 579-581. These figures are quoted by
Whighara, 0£. oit . , 333-335.

4Britain was L3, 000, 000, of which there were imports into Persia to
the value of a little over L&, 000, 000, and exports to Britain of
LI, 000, 000; the Russian trade amounted to approximately L2, 000, 000,
about £882,000 of which was imports in Persia and about LI, 164, 000,
exports. The value of the Russo-Persian trade was approximately
LI, 000,000 less than the total Anglo-Persian trade.
The first blow to British prestige came in 1891-1892, when
popular feeling in Persia rose to the breaking-point in the matter
of the Tobacco Concession. In 1890 a Concession was granted which
gave a monopoly of the purchase, sale, and manufacture of all the
tobacco in Persia, both for domestic use and exportation, for a
period of fifty years, to Major Talbot, who later transferred it to
the Imperial Tobacco Corporation of Persia. The company was to pay
the Persian Government L15.000 annually; then, after deducting all
expenses and paying a dividend of five per cent, on their capital
to the proprietors of the Concession, one-fourth of the remaining
8
profit was to be paid to the Persian Treasury each year. The year
1891 saw the inauguration of the Concession. The majority of the
Persians had not understood the nature and scope of this grant, but
as soon as they became better informed there was a bitter protest
against it thruout the country. The mullahs , or men learned in the
law, led the organized protest and asked for the repeal of the
monopoly. Russia was opposed to it also, and it seems that Russian
officials had some share in influencing and inciting the Persian
8
British State Papers
,
LXXKV, 608.

59
populace. Thruout the summer and fall of 1891 and January of 1892,
10 11
the opposition was maintained in Shiraz, Tabriz, Kerbela, and
other cities thruout the country; the demonstrations continually
became more violent until in January, 1892, a riot occurred in
Teheran in which the mob surrounded the ^hah's Palace in their
12
demand for the withdrawal of the Concession. The Shah finally
yielded and cancelled the Concession with a promise of compensation
to the Company. This affair was most unhappy for England; she
lost greatly in prestige and the Persians remembered the event for
13
several years.
This hostility toward England was, no doubt, pleasing to
the Russians who were ready to take advantage of every opportunity
to discredit England. Russia was not content with simply pursuing
a passive policy toward that end, but she took the initiative. In
9
On Sept. 16, 1890, Sir H. Drummond Yifolff sent a dispatch
to the Marquis of Salisbury in which he said the Russian Minister
at Teheran had protested against the Concession. British State
Papers
,
LXLXV, 610. In 1891, it was reported that the Russian
Minister had informed Russian subjects and protected subjects that
they could disregard the Concession. British State Papers
,
LXXXV,
614.
10
British State Papers
,
LXXXV, 611.
11
Annual Register
, 1891, part II, p. 69. Kerbela was out-
side of Persia, but it was important because one of the leaders of
the Moslem faith resided there.
12
annual Register
, 1892, part II, p. 1. Browne, The Per -
sian Revolution of 1905-1909
,
31-58. A full account of the whole
affair is given by Professor Browne.
13
Ibid
. ,
55, 57.

November of 1901, a commercial treaty was signed between Russia and
Persia, which was distinctly advantageous to the former. The
ratifications were exchanged in December, 1902, but an attempt was
made to keep it a secret a while longer, The treaty was enthusias-
tically received in Russia, but in England, with surprise and con-
14
sternation. It provided chiefly for a revision of the tariff.
The tariff charges on petroleum and sugar, the two principal im-
ports into Persia from Russia, were reduced,—the former, from 5
per cent, to 1 l/2 per cent., and the latter, from 5 per cent, to
2l/4 per cent. The duty on tea, one of the chief imports from
India, was raised to 100 per cent. This treaty "constituted a
15
notable diplomatic triumph for the northern power."
England was apparently in a difficult position. To make
the best of a bad situation the Government negotiated a treaty with
Persia, which would recognize the Russian treaty as an accomplished
fact and smooth over the affair with the loss of the least amount
of prestige. Accordingly, on February 9, 1903, a commercial treaty
between Great Britain and Persia was signed, the main provisions
of whiah placed specific duties on various articles of import and
export trade instead of the 5 per cent, ad valorem duty of the
16
Treaty of 1857. Reforms were also promised in the customs
14
Sykes, 0£. oit . , 483-484.
15
Ibid
. » 483.
16
Sessional Papers , 1903 [Cd. 1629] LXZXVII, 193.

7administration and the treaty seoured the "most -favored-nation
17
treatment" in commercial matters for both nations. In spite of
its liberal terms, the treaty was not as favorable as the one Russia
had negotiated.
The English also used their good offices in the settle-
ment of the boundary dispute between Persia and Afghanistan in the
province of Seistan. A British commission was appointed with
Colonel Mac Mahon at its head, and in 1905 after two years of hard-
ship and adventure, the work was completed, the decision being al-
18
most entirely in favor of the Persian claim.
Russian commerce had been steadily increasing during these
years. This fact was readily shown in the report on British trade
19
in Persia made by H. W. McLean in 1904. according to this report
the total Persian trade with Russia was valued at about 13, 500, 000,
of which LI, 500,000 consisted of exports from Persia, and 12,000,00Q
imports into Persia. The value of imports into Persia from the
different parts of the British Empire was about equal to the im-
ports from Russia, or 12,000,000 but the exports to Britain were
valued at only 1500,000. Thus the total value of Russian trade was
approximately £3,500,000, while that of England was only 12,500,000.
The report went on to state that Russia and Great Britain had a
17
Annual Register
,
1903, part I, p. 356.
18
Annual Register
,
1905, part I, pp. 370-371.
19
Sessional Papers , 1904 [Cd. 2146] XCV, 789. Report on
the Condition and Prospects of British Trade in Persia, by H. I.
McLean, Special Commissioner Intelligence Committee of the Board
of Trade. See p. 3 of the report.

predominating interest in trade with Persia; Russian trade, how-
ever, "shows a very marked increase in recent years, whilst British
20
trade shows neither marked increase nor decrease." Russia had
made marked improvements in her trading facilities with Persia;
the Russian bank, the Banque de PrSts de Perse, which was said to
he connected with the Russian State Bank and managed by a Russian
21
Government official, had also been a factor in this increase
in commerce. In 1900 and 1901 Russia advanced loans of L2, 400, 000
and il, 000,000 respectively, for which the customs of the country
22
(exclusive of the Gulf ports) were pledged as security. This,
too, strengthened Russian influence.
The British relations with Persia during the few years
preceding the signing of the Anglo-Russian Agreement have been
criticised and lamented by many writers. One authority says they
"constitute a long and not very brilliant chapter in our diplomatic
23
history." Whether the British record in Persia was creditable
or not, may be a matter of controversy, but there was a general
feeling among English writers and statesmen, and among foreigners
20
Sessional Papers , 1904 [Cd. 2146] XCV, 789, p. 3.
Whigham, op . cit
. ,
335-340, gives some comparative figures which do
not differ greatly from these. They were for the year, March, 1900
-March, 1901. These were not official. McLean's figures were
gotten from consular reports.
21
Sessional Papers , 1904 [ Cd. 2146] XCY, 789, p. 5.
22
Sykes, op_. cit
.
, 481-482. Browne, op_. cit . , 99, 101,
104.
23
David Eraser, Persia and Turkey in Revolt , 281-282.

9as well, that Russia was pursuing a policy of aggression, perhaps
aiming to secure a port, preferably Bander Abbas, on the Persian
Gulf, and continually threatening British power and order in India.
"JJorthern Persia is rapidly becoming Russian, and will at any rate
24
probably act with Russia," was a typical British view of Russia's
policy of commercial expansion. On the Persian Gulf, British
power had been supreme, and the idea of her exclusive rights there
had become traditional; Englishmen often spoke of a "Monroe Doc-
25
trine" in the Middle East, having in mind the policing and control
of the Persian Gulf by England. Lord Curzon said: "I should regard
the concession of a port upon the Persian Gulf to Russia by any
power as a deliberate insult to Great Britain, as a wanton rupture
of the status quo , and as an intentional provocation to war; and
I should impeach the British minister, who was guilty of acquies-
26
cing in such a surrender, as a traitor to his country." This
was in 1892, before Russian aggression had become so apparent.
An official declaration of Great Britain's intention to maintain
her paramount position was made in the House of Lords on i*lay 5,
1903, when in a speech, Lord Lansdowne said: "I say it without
he si tat ion- -we should regard the establishment of a naval base, or
24
Colquhoun, op. cit . , 168.
25
Lovat Fraser, India Under Curzon and After , 83.
26
Curzon, op . cit . , 465. Quoted by Colquhoun, op . cit .,
177; and by Lovat Eraser, ojo. cit . 85.

10
of a fortified port, in the Persian Gulf by any other Power as a
very grave menace to British interests, and we should certainly
27
resist it by all the means at oar disposal."
There was, no doubt, a Russian menace to British interests
in Persia and India, if not in reality, at least in the minds of a
great number of Englishmen, How was this menace to be met? Eng-
land was as strong in Persia commercially as she could expect; no
great increase in Anglo-Persian trade was possible. One opinion was,
and it had a considerable prevalence, that Persia could not much
longer escape foreign control; it was merely a question as to
whether the rulers would be many or single. In the meantime, it
was necessary to talk about the integrity of Persia, but while doing
so England should not be idle. If there was a British sphere of
29 30
influence it must be developed. A German writer held that alone
the British were almost powerless against Russia in Asia and that
it would be to England's benefit to form an alliance with the Cen-
tral Powers. Still others talked of "spheres of influence" and an
understanding, or agreement, with Russia for peaceful co-operation
27
Parliamentary Debates , Fourth series, CXXI 1348. Lovat
Fraser, op . cit . t 83.
28
The English were not alone in their suspicion of Russia's
motives; Dr. Rouire, La Rivalite- Anglo-Russe En^sie
,
248, raised
the question whether Russia's conduct was not a prelude to annex-
ation or a protectorate. See also Annual Register , 1903, part I,
p. 358.
29
Whigham, jop_. cit
.
, 391-392.
30
Popowski, The Rival Powers in Central Asia , 222.
"Great Britain is both politically and strategically almost powerless
against Russia in Asia, and ... Russia times her advance at her own

11
in Persia. Anglo-Russian rivalries were finally brought to an end
in 1907, when the latxer course was adopted and the ^.nglo -Russian
Agreement was signed.
discretion with due regard to the European political situation.
With every forward step which Russia makes Great Britain's authority
suffers, her position becomes a worse one, and the last hour of
her power in India seems no longer to loom in immesurable distance."

Chapter II
THE AIIGLO-RUSSIAU AGREEMENT
.
The iinglo-Russian Agreement, which was signed at St.
Petersburg on August 31, 1907, was an epoch-making document in many
respects. It was generally "believed at the time that it had
brought an end to the rivalries between England and Russia in oisia,
and even more than that, had made the two rivals, friends. It
had cemented the Triple Entente; England, France, and Russia now
had an understanding which bound them together as firmly as a
defensive alliance could, a balance of power had been struck in
European affairs.
The advisability, as well as the possibility, of coming
to some sort of an understanding with Russia had been the subject
of discussion in both official and unofficial circles in England
for several years prior to 1907, In the debate on the Agreement in
1
the House of Lords on February 6, 1908, Lord Curzon made the state-
ment that, when he had served Lord Salisbury in the Foreign Office
ten years earlier, his chief had drawn up a scheme for adjusting
the relations between the two countries thruout .asia on a much wider
basis even than the finished Agreement. When the papers regarding
affairs in Persia were laid before Parliament in 1908, among them
was an extract from a dispatch sent by the Government of India in
1
Parliamentary Debates , Fourth Series, CLXXXIII, 1001.

13
2
1899 to the India Office. This dispatch, signed by Lord Curzon
and five other officials, discussed the demarcation of British and
Russian "spheres of influence both political and commercial in
Persia," and recommended that "the experiment of an understanding
with Russia as to future spheres of interest in that country is
worthy of being made, in the interests both of Persia itself, and
still more of harmony between the two great Powers, upon whose rela-
3
tions the peace of Asia may be said to defend." i».t various times
4
the advisability of an understanding was discussed in Parliament
and always on these occasions opinion seemed to be favorable toward
5
such a policy. Both Lord Salisbury and Lord Lansdowne during their
terms in the Foreign Office had planned, and the latter had worked
for, an agreement with Russia in Persian affairs, but these plans
and attempts had been fruitless. The consummation of this policy
was left for Sir Edward Grey.
Hot only did the Government desire a rapprochement with
Russia, but Sir Edward seems to have favored it even before he be-
came the head of the Foreign Office. In the debate on Persian af-
fairs in the House of Commons on January 22, 1902, he spoke in favor
of England's retaining her influence in southern Persia and not
2
Sessional Papers
,
1908, Persia Ho, 1 [ Cd. 3882]CXi£V, 457.
3
Ibid
. , p. 11.
4
Parliamentary Debates , Fourth Series, C 1, 574-628.
5
Sir Edward Grey, in his speech on February 17, 1908, spoke
of Lord Lansdowne 1 s liberal policy. Parliamentary Debates , Fourth
Series, CLXXKIV, 496-497. See Lord Curzon's speech, Ibid . t CLXiXIII,
1001; also Lord Lansdowne's speech, lb i
d
.
, 1325. Granger, Eng-
land ! s World Policy
, 130.

14
yielding an inch, yet he held that there should be unrelaxed ef-
forts to oome to an understanding with other Powers and especially
b
with the Russian Government. The policy he then favored was this:
"an understanding between the two Governments which would result in
7
a fair and frank interchange ol interests in Asia."
Again, in 1^03, the question ol the Persian understanding
was up in the House of Commons. In answer to a question as to
whether there had been any communication with Russia with a view of
establishing an understanding as to their influence in Persia,
Lord Cranborne, the undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, replied
that His Majesty's Government desired an amicable understanding
between Great Britain and Russia in regard to their respective
interests in Persia and that "questions involving those interests
have lately been under discussion between the two Governments."
8
He had no papers, however, that could be laid before the House.
Sir Edward Grey became Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs in December, 1^05. Altho a member of the Liberal party
he had imperialistic views on foreign affairs. Ee continued the
policy marked out by his predecessors, and especially pushed the
negotiations with Russia until at last he was able to arrange a
working agreement with the Government of the Czar. The negotia-
tions necessary to arrange the Anglo-Ru3sian Convention covered
6
Parliamentary Debates, Fourth Series, CI, 608-613.
7
Ibid
. , 609.
8
Parliamentary Debates
, Fourth Series, CXLi, 105.

15
9
a period of approximately two years. The opinion had been voiced
before that time that Russia would never agree on the Persian
question because she would not give up her purpose of securing a
10
port on the Persian (Julf and perhaps of attacking India. But
in 1907 Russia was willing to agree. We mast bear in mind, however
that Russia had just finished a war with Japan, which had been
rather disastrous to the Government of the Czar. The Russian Rev-
olution of 1905 had also helped to break the power of Russia.
These events not only weakened Russia at home, but they shattered
her pride and weakened her prestige abroad. The time was oppor-
11
tune for England and Russia to settle their disputes in Asia;
the opportunity was seized and on August 31, 1907, the Anglo-Rus-
sian Agreement was signed at St. Petersburg by M. Isvolsky, the
Russian Foreign Minister, and Sir Arthur Nicolson, the British
Ambassador to the Court of the Czar. The greater share of the
9
While Lord Lansdowne may have favored an understanding
with Russia, the negotiations which had a direct bearing on the
Agreement were probably carried on after Sir Edward Jrey became
Foreign Secretary. For opinions on the length of the negotiations
see: Hamilton, Problems of the Middle East
, 116, 187; Browne,
The P ersian Revolution of 1905-1909
, 175; Cont emporary Review ,
November, 1907, p. 699
; ""
Forum
,
January, 1908, p. 339. A question
was asked in the House of Commons about the negotiations in
progress on March 29, 1906; Parliamentary Debates , Fourth Series,
CLIV, 1534.
10
Whigham, op. cit . , 390.
11
Rouire, La Rivalitg An-?io-Russe En Asie , 260-261. Dr.
Rouire speaks of the opportunity for an understanding after the
Husso- Japanese War, and describes the development of good feeling
between England and Russia during the Algeciras Conference in
1906. See also magazine articles on this point.

16
credit, or blame, for it, from the English point of view, must he
given to the consistent efforts of Sir Edward Grrey.
12
Hot only did the Agreement settle British and Russian
affairs in Persia by marking out spheres of influence, hut there
were also important provisions regarding Afghanistan and Tihet. The
section concerning Persia began with the general declaration that
the Governments of Jreat Britain and Russia had mutually agreed
"to respect the integrity and independence of Persia," and sincere-
ly desired"the preservation of order thruout that country and its
peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of
13
equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations."
Each nation, however, had special interests in certain parts of
Persia, so they agreed to certain specific arrangements. In the
first place a Russian sphere of influence was marked off in
northern Persia, extending no farther than to a line "starting from
Kasr-i-Shirin [which is on the Turkish frontier], passing thru
Ispahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian fron-
tier at the intersection of the Russian and Afghan frontiers."
In this sphere the British were not to seek concessions of a
political or commercial nature, such as concessions for railways,
12
The full text of the Agreement is found in: British
State Papers
,
C, 555-560; Sessional Papers , 1908 [Cd. 3750
J
477; Ibid . , 1908 [Gd. 3753J CXXV, 489/ Also quoted by Hamilton,
op. cit
. ,
189-192, 209-210, 216-217; the section relating to Persia
Is quoted by Granger, England 1 s World Empire , 130-133.
13
In the Preamble. See Sessional Papers , 1908 [Gd. 3753]
CXXXV, 489, p. 9.

17
"banks, telegraphs, roads, transports, insurance, etc., and were not
to oppose demands for such concessions made or supported by the
Russian Government. This provision made Russian political and
commercial rights paramount in the northern section of Persia. In
the second place, Russia agreed to recognize the superiority of
British claims to similar political and commercial influence in an
area in south-eastern Persia extending to a line drawn from the
Afghan frontier "by way of Gazik, Birjand, Kerman, and ending at
Bander AbDas. Article III stated that the strip of territory "be-
tween the Russian and British zones was to be open for the grant
of concessions to the subjects of both contracting parties; the
concessions already existing in the Russian and English spheres
were to be maintained. In Article IV it was agreed that all the
Persian customs with the exception of those of Farsistan and the
Persian Gulf were to be used in meeting the existing Persian
obligations to Russia; the revenues from Farsistan and the Persian
Gulf as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the
Caspian Sea, and the revenues of the posts and telegraphs should be
devoted to the service of the British loans arranged previous to
the signing of the Agreement. Article V arranged for joint action
between the two nations in case Persia failed to pay her obliga-
tions; they would determine the measure of control to be used by
14
friendly arrangement and cooperation.
14
For the section relating to Persia see: Sessional
Papers , 1908 [Cd. 3753] GZXV, 489, pp. 9-11.

18
15
In the section of the Agreement relating to Afghanistan,
Russia agreed to recognize the political predominance of Great
Britain in that country. This was litxle more than reaffirming
the status quo , for Russia had on previous occasions recognized the
superiority of British influence there and had repeatedly promised
16 17
not to meddle in Afghan affairs. In Tibet the two contracting
nations agreed to respect its territorial integrity and to ab-
stain from all interference in its internal administration. The
suzerainty of China was also recognized. Russia and England also
engaged not to seek any commercial concessions or rights in Tibet.
While these arrangements concerning Tibet and Afghanistan dia not
bear directly on Persian affairs, they had an indirect bearing on
them and had some influence on the general Asiatic policy.
In the Agreement no mention was made of the Persian
Gulf. It was on this point that so much criticism developed in
England. As has already been pointed out, the British regarded
their rights paramount on the Persian Gulf, and even referred to
it as a British lake. Sir Edward Grey, however, did not overlook
15
Ibid
. , pp. 11-12.
16
Ghirol, The Middle Eastern Question
,
535, 339. On Feb-
ruary 17, 1908, Sir Edward Grey said: "These Russian pledges are
embodied for the first time in a binding undertaking between the
two Governments
,
and, as Lord Lansdowne pointed out, they are now
given in a form more thoro and satisfactory than anything we ever
had before," Parliamentary Debates . Fourth Series, CLXXXIV, 489.
See also Ibid
. ,
OLXXXIII, 1328-1329.
17
Sessional Papers, 1908 [Cd. 3753] CXXV, 489, pp. 12-13.

19
this point entirely, altho no disposal was made in the Agreement.
a dispatch sent by the British Foreign Secretary to Sir Arthur
Bicolson on august £9, concerning the status of the Persian Gulf
18
was published with the Convention. It stated the British atti-
tude as follows:
"The arrangement respecting Persia is limited to the
regions of that country touching the respective frontiers of
Great Britain and Russia in Asia, and the Persian Gulf is not
part of those regions, and is only partly in Persian territory. It
has not therefore been considered appropriate to introduce into the
Convention a positive declaration respecting special interests
possessed by Great Britain in the Gulf, the result of British ac-
tion in those waters for more than a hundred years.
"His Majesty's Government have reason to believe that
this question will not give rise to difficulties between the two
Governments should developments arise which make further discussion
affecting British interests in the Gulf necessary. For the Russian
Government have in the course of the negotiations leading up to
the conclusion of this arrangement explicitly stated that they do
not deny the special interests of Great Britain in the Persian
Gulf--a statement of which His Majesty's Government have formally
taken note.
"In order to make it quite clear that the present arrange-
ment is not intended to affect the position in the Gulf, and does
not imply any change of policy respecting it on the part of Great
Britain, His Majesty's Government think it desirable to draw at-
tention to previous declarations of British policy, and to reaf-
firm generally previous statements as to British interests in the
Persian Gulf and the importance of maintaining them.
"His Majesty's Government will continue to direct all
their efforts to the preservation of the status quo in the Gulf
and the maintenance of British trade; in doing so, they have no
desire to exclude the legitimate trade of any other Power."
From this declaration it would seem that the question of
18
Sessional Papers , 1908 [Cd. 3750] CXXV, 477, p. 2;
British State Papers
,
CIII, 644-645.

EO
the Persian Gulf had been discussed during the negotiations by the
plenipotentiaries, and that Russia had given taoit consent to the
supremacy of England there. At any rate, Sir Edward Grey, for his
part, stated his attitude in unequivocal terms and stated that the
British Government had formally taken note of Russia's acquiescence.
Russia could hardly secure greater political influence on the Gulf,
and if she should secure control of a port there it would he in
violation of the Agreement, since none of the Russian sphere bor-
dered on the Gulf.
The Agreement was favorably received in both countries
for it was felt that it had brought the rivalries between Russia
and Great Britain in Asia to a close and that in the future there
19
would be no more friction in this part of the world. Not only
did the Convention settle affairs between them in Asia, but it was
also the final act in the cementing of the Triple Entente. France
and Russia had bound themselves together by the formation of the
Dual Alliance in 1891; in 1904 France and England laid aside their
differences and settled all their conflicts by the signing of an
arrangement which later came to be known as the Entente Cordiale.
By these two arrangements France had in a measure allied herself
with both England and Russia. It was generally thought that Eng-
land and Russia could not form an alliance because of the great
difference in their institutions, the former, the most democratic
19
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Government of Europe, the latter, among the most autocratic. But
difficulty was overcome and Asiatic affairs were used as a means
to secure a closer understanding in European affairs; thus France,
England and Russia formed an entente which was little less than a
formal alliance.
There seems to have been more unanimity among the Russian
papers in their approval of the Convention than there was among the
20
English. Some of them frankly admitted that before the Japanese
War such a treaty would have been impossible, but with the defeat
of the Russian armies on the plains of Manchuria was shattered the
hope of the conquest of India. The Russia of 1907 was not the
Russia of ten years earlier. ^.ltho she had for some years held
out the scare of an attack on India, she seemed at last, after the
Japanese War and the Revolution at home, to have yielded to the
inevitable. The newspapers viewed the Agreement in a broader light
than usual and expressed the opinion that Russia had made a good
bargain. The treaty ought to pave the way to abiding friendship
between the two countries and, as the Slavo remarked, "secure
Russia from any danger she may have feared from the ambition of
ai
Germany. * While there was not as much unanimity of sentiment
among the English papers, the Agreement was usually acceptable.
The Manchester Guardian , with no great enthusiasm for it, said:
SO
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"The Anglo-Russian Convention seems to us to merit neither strong
praise nor strong blame. Things in Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet
were drifting in certain directions. The convention in each case
takes note of the drift, formalizes it, and, as it were, legalizes
it. Such agreements are often worth making, but they seldom give
sufficient cause for having the bells rung, or for tearing out hair
22
either, and so it is with this one." The London Morning Post
seemed to view it in a broader light when it said: '"The signifi-
cance of the Anglo-Russian convention is not to be found by the
study of its details. It is a handshaking, not a bargain. It
23
takes things as they are and records them."
While the principle of the Agreement met with quite
general satisfaction, there were those who objected to some of the
terms. It is interesting to note that thruout all this adverse
criticism there was hardly a voice raised to say that Persia had
not been consulted, that a free country had been divided into
spheres of influence without her knowledge and without having a word
24
to say. That fact was only brought out incidentally. The prin-
cipal objection was that Russia had gotten more than her share,
that Sir Edward Grey had been beaten in the game of diplomacy,
that the good will of Russia had been purchased at too great a
price, and that there was no definite arrangement concerning the
22
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Persian Gulf. Such men as Angus Hamilton, Perceval Landon,
27 28
a. Vambery, and many others could see nothing but a loss for
England, and much editorial comment held that Sir Edward Grey had
lost more by this transaction than he had gained.
England and Russia, however, were not the only interested
parties involved. How was the ^nglo-Russian .agreement received in
Persia? Altho the Convention was signed on august 31, Sir Edward
Grey seemingly did not notify Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British
Minister at Teheran, until September 7, when he gave instructions
for the Minister to inform the Persian Government of the signing of
the Agreement and to reassure them that the independence and in-
tegrity of Persia was to be respected. He explained that the Con-
vention was merely to avoid misunderstandings between the two
Governments and that it could "not fail to promote the prosperity,
security, and ulterior development of Persia in the most effica-
29
cious manner.** Of course these instructions were carried out.
But even before this, a communication had been made to the Persian
Government by Sir Ceoil Spring-Rice, whether with the knowledge of
of Sir Edward Grey it is difficult to tell. The latter, during the
25
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30
debates on Persian affairs in 1911, denied having any knowledge
of this statement. By September 5, Persian discussion of the terms
of the treaty, which were not actually known but were the subject
of speculation, had become so violent and hostile, that some explan-
ation or reassurance seemed necessary. For that reason, Sir C.
Spring-Rice sent a note to the Persian Government containing the
31
following sweeping statements and promises. "The Agreement, based
as it is, on the guarantee of Persia's independence and integrity,
can only serve to further and promote Persian interests, for hence-
forth Persia, aided and assisted by her two powerful neighbors, can
employ all her powers in internal reforms.... Jffot only do they not
wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object
in these friendly negotiations was not to allow one another to
interfere on the pretext of safeguarding their respective interests. 1
These reassurances were used to quiet public opinion for the time
being, and in due time the text of the Agreement was communicated
32
to the Shah*s Government. On October 5, it was read in the Assera-
30
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bly and in the brief discussion which ensued, it was reported that
33
the tone of most of the speakers was moderate. The Persian
Foreign Minister later acknowledged the receipt of the .agreement
34
regarding Persia, which note also was "free from objections."
He refused to admit, however, that the provisions of the Treaty were
binding on Persia; his note to the British Minister stated that
"the above-mentioned agreement having been concluded between the
British and Russian Governments, therefore its provisions will
concern the aforementioned Governments who have signed the agree-
ment. ** He affirmed that Persia as a free and independent state
35
was not subject to any arrangement made by outside Powers.
The newspapers of Persia, such as the Habl-ul-Matin and
36
the Tamaddun , published articles opposed to the a.nglo-Russian
Convention during the earlier part of September, but soon they
turned their attention to more engrossing local affairs which had
arisen, a quotation from one of these may well represent the
37
general tenor of Persian feeling:
"In these days it is rumored that the above-mentioned
Agreement has emerged from the realms of consideration and discus-
sion, and that all its provisions and clauses have been arranged
in their final form. ^-11 discriminating and well-informed persons
suspect that, in view of our negligence and ignorance, the signing
of the Agreement will be shortly followed by the end of Persia's
33
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independence and autonomy, For as soon as the agreement is signed,
the contracting Powers will at once begin to give it practical
effect, and to pursue their respective ambitions,...
"Bow, altho this Agreement ostensibly professes to aim at
preserving the independence of Persia, whereby some of our deputies
have been deceived and have declared in the assembly that this
agreement will not hurt Persia, since its primary object is to safe-
guard her independence, yet such as are versed in the jargon of
politics know very well that wherever one of these Powers has ac-
quired influence, it has done so under the guise of just such spec-
ious and fair-seeming words. Mow if these two Powers really desired
the continuance of Persia's sovereignty, then there was no need for
such an .agreement. Are the United States of America or Japan
likely to come from the Far West or the Far East respectively in
order to at back or subjugate Persia, that there should be any need
for such an Agreement? It is clear that the danger which threatens
Persia is precisely from these two Powers [which are parties to the
Agreement], and that, if they had no sinister designs, there would
have been no need for any Agreement or Convention."
The agreement was debated in the House of Lords on
February 6, and February 10, 1908, and in the House of Commons on
38
February 17, 1908. In both Houses there was opposition to the
Convention, not so much to the spirit of the treaty or the motives
that were back of it, but toward the specific provisions that Sir
Edward Grey had been able uo get. Lord Curzon, who criticised the
terms most severely, was not at all reluctant to admit the prime
importance of an understanding with Russia, during his speech he
declared that for his own part, he regarded "this treaty as the
most far-reaching, the most important treaty that has been con-
39
eluded oy the British Government during the past fifty years."
Lord Lamiiigton saia: "fte have for years past deplored the lack oi
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40
agreement with Russia in regard to Persia," yet he criticised
the agreement when it finally was concluded. On the floor of the
House of Commons, Earl Percy was careful to explain that he wel-
comed the spirit which had prompted the Agreement and made it clear
that the criticisms he voiced did not imply that the leaders of the
Opposition would be unwilling loyally to carry out the obligations;
he contended, however, that the sacrifices made by England were
41
excessive and that the terms of the Convention were ambiguous.
On the whole the criticism was comparatively mild and the Agreement
was generally supported.
Sir Edward Grey, in the debate on February 17, defended
his policy and replied to the most important of the criticisms
voioed against it. The greatest objections were that Russia had
received a much larger sphere of influence than England, that in
the Russian sphere the majority of the most important cities as
Teheran, Tabriz, and Ispahan, were located, the most fertile and
productive part of the country was that northern area, and it also
contained the greater number of important trade-routes. It was
pointed out that the British sohere was smaller; there were only
42
two cities of any importance, Bander Abbas and German, the term-
inals of the only important trade-route in this sphere; furthermore
a great part of this area was desert and unproductive. The
40
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Opposition contended that Russia had secured a much more desirable
43
territory from a commercial point of view. Another point that
created much comment was the absence of any statement in the Agree-
ment concerning the status of the Persian Gulf. They felt that
British influence and control was supreme there and wanted that fact
recognized Dy a specific statement in the accord. The note ex-
plaineng the situation, published simultaneously with the Agreement,
was not a sufficient recognition on the part of Russia.
The speech of the Secretary of State for foreign affairs
44
was able and comprehensive. He spoke immediately after Earl
Percy who had opposed the agreement. Sir Edward referred to the
statement of the Earl that the Treaty was ambiguous; he admitted
that it was to a certain extent, but "there is no agreement which
cannot be said to be ambiguous.... *my agreement, however clearly
expressed, cannot avoid the charge of ambiguity any more than a
Bill drawn by the best draftsman presented to this House has ever
averted a charge of ambiguity being brought against it by the Op-
45
position." Some critics said it was not comprehensive; in reply
the Foreign Minister said that all questions between Russia and
Great Britain were not settled by the Convention; such a thing could
not have been attempted. If it had there would have been no Agree-
46
ment at all. The situation had become serious and something had
43
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to be done; he had adopted the most favorable policy under the
circumstances.
Sir Edward Grey also discussed the advantage of the lines
drawn in the -agreement over another line that had been suggested
before. That former line, which would have run, roughly, thru
47
Khanikin, Kermanshah, Haraadan, Ispahan, Yezd, Kerm&n to Seistan,
would have divided Persia into two parts, the northern one going to
Russia as a sphere of influence, and the southern part to England.
Many of the objections that were directed at the division, as it had
been made, were also applicable to the other plan; Teheran and most
of the important commercial centers would still have been in the
Russian sphere. This plan, however, had its objections, said Sir
Edward Grey; "Russia would have been left within striking distance
48
of Seistan." For that the Government could have been rightly
accused of having for commercial prospects sacrificed what ought
to have been the main and first point of any Agreement between Great
Britain and Russia, namely strategic advantage." It is the strat-
49
egical position which makes the Agreement desirable and essential;"
Seistan is the key to the strategical position. Thruout his speech,
Sir E. Grey emphasized the strategic advantage of the existing
spheres.
50
He then reviewed the history of the Russian advance in
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Persia during the preceding twenty years, both in commerce and
political influence; he held that England was not supreme, as. she
had once been, and as Lord Curzon had tried to make them believe.
On this point he said:
"When I consider how the position has changed in the last
twenty years, and when I am told that by this .agreement we have
thrown away great prospects and great commercial advantages, I say
you must take into account the situation with which we had to deal
and the starting point from which the Agreement had to be made.
I cannot believe that anybody who realizes what the situation as
regards Persia was when we began to discuss this Agreement can
believe that under it we have really sacrificed great commercial
prospects which there was any chance of our realizing in future
years..,. Under this Agreement we have given up nothing that was
not gone before "51
He defended his stand on the settlement of the question
of the Persian Gulf. f\a.s to the Persian Gulf, what we have from
the Russian Government is in writing, and it is quoted, the
material part of it textually, in the despatch written to the
52
British Ambassador at St. Petersburg." While he was hopeful that
the Agreement augured well for the future, he was reluctant to
say that all danger of interference in Persia was over. "With the
internal troubles that exist, and with the troubles on the Turkish
frontier, no one can say with certainty what will happen. But
the danger of interference by ourselves or Russia is greatly
53
diminished."
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Sir Edward Grey closed his speech by saying that the
Agreement had been signed in the spirit of friendship and coopera-
tion, and he hoped and believed that it would be of mutual ad-
vantage to both England and Russia. He contended that if the Op-
position came into power they would find that the position of the
54
country had been strengthened by the Anglo-Russian Convention.
The foreign comment aroused by the signing of the Anglo-
Russian Agreement is both interesting and significant. The atti-
tude in England and Russia has already been pointed out and the
Persian hostility has been discussed, jiut haw was it viewed by
the rest of the European countries and in the United States?
55
France openly rejoiced over the Convention, since it
practically allied the contracting nations to her; a new feeling
56
in Europe had been created, a. Maurice Low described the French
press as being "jubilant" since anything that tended to remove
friction between England and Russia "knocks another prop from under
Germany and strengthens the English support of France." The Paris
Tempa explained the situation as follows: "It is of great value
to France that her alliance with Russia and her entente with Eng-
land, which some statesmen have looked upon as incompatible, should
54
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now have become ratified and confirmed by a direct understanding
between London and St. Petersburg. Our moral standing in Europe
57
will henceforth be strengthened." This was the last move in the
formation of the Triple Entente, which was pleasing to France.
The understanding was not so desirable to Germany. The
consensus of opinion was that it practically closed Persia to German
58
influence. Dr. Paul Rohrbach distrusted England and felt that it
59
was part of a vast British imperial policy, menacing to Germany.
He even said that "The published part of the English-Russian pact,
which referred to Persia was meant to hide a further agreement
60 61
directed against Turkey and Germany." another German felt
that by the treaty England had scored a brilliant success, .an
observer of opinion on foreign affairs held that the German press
was compelled grudgingly to admit that England had fortified her
62
position in Europe and had riveted her hold on the Persian Gulf.
Count Ernst zu Reventlow believed that the enmity King Edward VII
held toward Germany was a reason for this new good feeling toward
Russia, and that this feeling of hostility governed the policy of
57
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the English Government from that time on; France also encouraged the
Anglo-Russian rapproohment since it was in the direction of her
interests. On march 29, 1909, almost two years after the Agreement
was signed, Prince von Bttlow before the Reichstag declared that
there was no reason for Germany opposing the Anglo-Russian accord,
"which respects the independence and integrity of Persia as well as
63
the principle of the open door." If he was sincere in his opinion
it was contrary to the general German view. Because of the fact
that Edward VII and Sir Edward Grey were considered enemies of
Germany by the Germans, and since the formation of the Triple En-
tente had "been brought about by the Agreement, the chances for Anglo-
German friendship were somewhat diminished.
The opinion on the agreement in the United States was not
at all critical; no act of international immorality was detected
by the press. It was considered quite reasonable, even quite re-
64
markable, and creditable to both parties.
The real effects of this agreement could not be seen at
that time. The attitude of the world seemed to be quite uncrit-
ical, at least not openly hostile except in Persia itself, as time
went on, however, and the provisions were put into operation com-
plications arose; affairs in Persia became no better t --perhaps even
worse, --and opinion in England, in Persia, and in America became
63
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more bitter and critical toward Anglo-Russian management in Persia.
Much as Sir Edward Grey had defended his work of diplomacy at the
time of its negotiation, much as he had praised its virtues, and
much as he had denied that England had lost in the transaction, he,
too, was forced to change his opinion somewhat. This change of
opinion was gradual, but let it suffice at this point to state
that in 1912, Sir Edward complained to the Russian Minister for
Foreign Affairs, U» Sazonof, that England had not received a
65
large enough sphere of influence in comparison with that of Russia.
Thus he was forced to admit that the Agreement, as far as its ap-
plication to affairs in ^sia was concerned, was not as favorable
to England as he had been led to believe in 1907.
65
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Chapter III
THE BRITISH POLICY Iff PERSIa, 1907-1910.
The generally favorable attitude toward the anglo-Russian
.agreement which obtained shortly after it had been negotiated by
Sir Edward Grey and M. Isvolsky, was not to be wondered at since the
future working of the Agreement was as yet only a matter of specula-
tion and its probably satisfactory development, only a matter of
academic discussion. How it was really developed and applied in
Persia by these two statesmen is a different matter and will be
dealt with to some extent in this chapter, At the outset it may be
said that the scheme did not work as well as the interested parties
had hoped. This phase of the discussion will be limited to the
period from the signing of the agreement until the arrival, in 1911,
of W. Morgan Shuster in Persia to take charge of the Persian finance.
The conditions which obtained in 1907 changed considerably during
this period of little less than four years.
Before going into this discussion of the British Govern-
ment's policy in Persia during this period, it will make the con-
nections and significance more apparent if a short review of af-
fairs in Persia is first given. Since 1900, and perhaps a few years
before, there had been a growing movement opposed to the reactionary
Shah and his medieval method of government, and in favor of a fixed
code of laws and a representative assembly. The agitation had been
started by a few patriotic Persians who either had been educated
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in Europe or had traveled there quite extensively. The movement
grew; patriotic and more enlightened leaders were found, until the
movement grew serious. In 1905 seven or eight merchants at Teheran
2
were "bastinadoed by the Governor; as a protest a large number of
the most prominent merchants, many of the mullahs and many of the
later popular leaders took bast (sanctuary) at the Royal Mosque and
the holy shrine of Shah Abdul-^zim. This "first bast," as it was
called was merely a protest against the old order of things. On
January 21, 19C6, the Shah made vague promises of reform, but noth-
ing was done toward that end. ^ riot broke out in the capital on
June 21, at which time the patriots demanded a code of laws. The
mullahs , merchants, and leaders took bast , this time in the gardens
of the British and Russian Legations. By august 1, the number
3
of refugees at the British Legation was 13,000. The Shah yielded
to the popular demand on august 5, and promised a national assembly,
a Court of Justice, and the dismissal of the Grand Vizier. The
National Consultative .assembly thus established was opened on
1
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October 7, 1906, by the Shah and a Constitution was drawn up and
4
signed by him on December 30. Under this royal grant, the .First
Me j lis, or Parliament, sat from October 7, 1906, until June 23,
1908.
At the beginning of 1907, the old Shah, Muzaffer-u-Din,
died and was succeeded by Mohammed Ali who was crowned January 19,
1907. Friction between the Shah and the Me«jlis soon resulted;
Mohammed Ali finally attempted a coup d ' etat but failed, and
acceeded to the demands of the Constitutionalists, or nationalists,
(as the reform party was called) and swore to uphold the Constitu-
tion. On February 28, 1908, there was an attempt to assassinate
the Shah. Shortly after that he left Teheran under strong pro-
tection and established himself at the armed camp, Bagh-i-Shah.
Colonel Liahkoff, a Russian in the pay of the Persian Government
5
and supposedly free from Russian influence, in command of a body
of Persian Cossacks entered Teheran, proclaimed martial law,
ordered the dissolution of Parliament, and became Military Governor.
Some of the members of the Assembly would not leave, so the Par-
liament House was bombarded on June 23, 1908. Fighting followed
this act, but the troops of the Shah had the better of it, and
gained control of the city.
4
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In the meantime a lively fight was going on at Tabriz,
which after a long and stout resistance finally surrendered to the
nationalists. The rebels then marched on Teheran, gathering
strength as they pressed forward. The Shah, on May 5, 1909, pro-
claimed a general amnesty for those who had been in opposition to
him but it came too late and was not accepted. The Nationalists
entered Teheran, and on July 16, the Shah, Mohammed Ali, took re-
fuge in the Russian Legation; this was considered equivalent to an
abdication. His twelve year old son, ^hmad Mirza, became Shah on
6
July 18, under the regency of Azad-ul-Mulk. New elections were
ordered, and on November 15, 1909, the new Parliament began its
sessions which continued for more than two years.
During this whole period there was more or less turmoil
and unrest; Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, the British Minister at Teheran,
described the state of affairs in Persia at this time as "peaceful
7
anarchy'*. So the patience of the two signatories to the agreement
had a problem before them that taxed the abilities of their states-
men.
Sir Edward Grey, early in February, 1907, before the
Anglo-Russian Convention was signed, had declared himself opposed
to intervention by Russia or any other power. In a dispatch to
Sir Cecil Spring-Rice he said: '*The view held by His Majesty's
Government is that any proposals for measures of a military nature
6
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8
would be opposed to the principle of non-intervention.'* He in-
formed Sir Arthur Mcolson, the British Minister at St, Petersburg,
that he concurred with the Minister at Teheran in deprecating inter
vention in the internal affairs of Persia. He was quite consistent
ly opposed to intervention thruout this whole period.
M. Isvolsky was not nearly so definite in his attitude on
intervention. When Sir Arthur Mcolson interviewed him, the
Russian Minister said he was puzzled as to what course should he
taken, but at that time (December 11, 1907) he had been advised
9
against a military demonstration. It was explained that Russia
was in a more difficult position because of the nearness of her
frontier and her important interests in the districts that were
then the scene of the greatest revolutionary activities, espe-
10
cially at Tabriz.
During 1907 and 1908, the loan of 1903-1904 made to
Persia by Great Britain was the cause of numerous demands on the
part of Sir Edward Grey. He protested at first that the interest
11
was long over due, and demanded an immediate payment. If Persia
did not comply with this request, the instant payment of the sink-
ing fund would immediately be demanded. Earlier Sir Edward had
been willing to suspend the payment of the sinking fund for three
8
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years provided Persia did not contract a loan without the option
IE
first being given to England or Russia. On February 17, 1908,
he informed Mr. Marling, the British Ckarge* d^ffairs at Teheran,
that if the payment of the interest was not made by April 4, in-
ly
terest to the sum already due would have to be added. These terms
had not been complied with by August 10, so Mr. Marling informed
the Persian Government that the above-mentioned terms would have to
14
be applied.
This matter of finance, however, was pushed into the
background by exigencies more important. By the beginning of June,
1908, the nationalist movement had become very serious to the Shah,
who at this time was at his armed camp, Bagh-i-Shah. The Russian
minister at Teheran, M. de Hartwig, suggested that the two Powers
pledge to maintain the ruling Persian dynasty, thinking that such
an attitude would have a sobering effect on the agitators at
15
Teheran. Sir Edward Grey would not agree to such a proposal;
while he considered it "of the greatest importance that the policy
of the two Governments should be in perfect accord", he strongly
deprecated any action "which might have the appearance of inter-
16
vening in the internal affairs of Persia." He wanted the
12
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Persians to have a Government enjoying the full confidence and sup-
port of the people, and such a result, he thought, could better be
obtained without external influence. Sir Edward did maintain,
however, that allowing the Persians to take bast at the British le-
gation was not intervention. It was an old r4ght and custom among
the Persians that those whose lives were endangered in a political
or similar crisis could take bast , or sanctuary, in some sacred
building or at the foreign legations. This method had been used
17
earlier as a protest against the Shah. But on June 23, 1908, a
body of Persian Cossacks had entered Teheran and bombarded the
Parliament House; fighting had followed and as a result a number of
refugees took bast » the number gradually increasing. The English
policy was to try to discourage this practice out the British
Minister was instructed to refuse to give up the refugees already
19
there. The Shah's officials and methods became more and more
obnoxious to the British because a guard was placed around the le-
gation to prevent more refugees from entering and to keep those
20
already there from leaving. This was considered an insult and
21
Sir Edward Grey demanded an apology. In spite of this insult,
22
in a firm note on June 29, he again asserted that he had "no in-
17
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terest nor desire to intervene in any way in the internal affairs"
of Persia. And again on July 13, he reaffirmed this statement in
23
a note to Mr. Marling explaining that refuge was only granted in
the Legation in order to save life, and not to lend assistance to
any political enterprise, as the Government of the Shah had accused
the British of doing.
In the meantime the situation had been growing worse,
24
especially at Tabriz; the Nationalists had no idea of letting up
in their demands. Because of the gravity of the situation all over
Persia, Sir Edward Grey, on September 2, recommended that a joint
communication by the Russian and British Governments should be
25
made to the Shah. The purpose of this communication should be
two-fold: first, it should contain a statement that the two Govern-
ments had taken a very serious view of the situation at Tabriz, and
that they would hold the Persian Government responsible if any
British or Russian subjects were harmed; and secondly, pressure
should be put on the Shah to give orders for new elections and to
reassemble the Mejlis on November 14. This was done by the British
26
and Russian representatives at Teheran on September 8; the Shah's
27
reply was not very definite or satisfactory on these points.
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He seemed to resent the interference of the two Governments.
Early in September, 1908, the question of a joint loan
to Persia came up. neither Russia nor Great Britain had made a
loan to Persia since the establishment of the Constitution and the
meeting of the first Me j lis. An Anglo-Russian advance would have
been forthcoming at any time If Persia had desired it, but the
Assembly refused to accept a European loan. On this point it as-
serted its power from the very beginning; the members refused a
loan on the ground that the public revenues ought not to be pledged
28
to foreigners. To put the finances of the country on a sound
basis they proposed to found and endow a National Bank. As long
as the Mejlis remained in session it would not consent to a foreign
loan. 3ut after June 23, 1908, when Parliament was dissolved, the
Shah had been asking for a loan and at first, both Russia and
29
England seemed ready to advance a sura of h 400,000. Sir Edward
Grey would consent to it on condition that it should not be used
for the suppression of the Constitution and that it should be con-
30
trolled by suitable guarantees. That was on September 5, 1908;
but by December 24, he thought it would be advisable to wait until
a Constitution had been established before making an advance to
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31
the Shah, for in the meantime the latter had refused to grant
32
an Assembly, which he held was contrary to Islam. Sir
Edward maintained that "to give the Shah money in the present cir-
cumstances would he v/orse than futile, and would amount to inter-
33
vention in Persia's internal affairs."
Until the beginning of 1309, Sir Edward Jrey and ]f.
Isvclsky had been in more or less accord regarding affairs in Per-
34
sia; both apparently were opposed to intervention to secure
order as long as the lives of foreigners were not endangered.
Professor 3rowne thought that F.ussia had refrained somewhat from
an aggressive policy because of the restraining inlluence of Sir
Edward Jrey, and had not sent troops into Persia, and had espe-
cially abandoned the expedition to Tabriz, proposed in October,
1908, because of Sir Edward's warning that it would produce a very
bad impression in England. Certain Russian officials who had re-
actionary sympathies and favored an aggressive forward policy had
35
been recalled apparently to keep the good will of England. The
Russian Foreign ivlinister, however, seemed to be in favor of grant-
31
Sessional Papers
,
(Persia No. 2) 1909 [Cd. 4733] CV,
725, p. 15, 110. 27.
32
Ibid
. ,
(Persia No. 1) 1909 [Cd. 4581] CY, pp. 208-210,
Nos. 313-315.
33
Browne, op. c it .
,
266-267; Sessional Paoers
,
(Persia
No. 2) 1909 [Cd. 4733J CV, p. 22, No. 52; pp. 43-44, No. 70.
34
I bid.
, p. 1, No. 1; p. 2, No. 6; p. 5, No. 10; p. 16,
No. 29.
35
Browne, op. cit
.
, 340.

36
ing the Sheh a loan, and early in 1909, openly favored such an
advance; he could not understand why Sir Edward was opposed to
37
granting it. In March, Russia began to move troops to Baku and to
the frontier at Julfa to he in readiness to enter Persia if condi-
tions grew much worse, and at the same time fifty Cossacks were dis-
38
patched to Resht for the protection of the Russian Consulate.
Finally, on April 20, M« Isvolsky decided to send troops to Tabriz
39
and, on -april 23, a Russian force was ordered to move. By the
40
end of ^pril, there were Russian troops at Meshed and Tabriz.
From that time on until the outbreak of the Great European War,
Russian troops were maintained in Persia, and instead of the num-
ber being decreased, it was usually increased.
At that time Sir Edward Grey did not object to the send-
ing of Russian soldiers into Persia, but he understood that they
were only being sent for the protection of lives and that they would
be withdrawn in a short time. In fact he could not object for at
almost the same time, the state of "peaceful anarchy" in south
Persia had become ao menacing that he dispatched a gunboat to
41
Bushire and on *.pril 10, one hundred blue-jackets were landed to
36
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48
protect foreigners. This detachment, however, was re-embarked
43
again on May 20.
Ruasia finally decided to advance a small loan to Persia
44
but Sir Edward Grey refused. The agreement for this loan was
45
drawn up in June, 1909, the amount being L 100,000. In July,
Russia sent more troops into Persia, this time to Enzeli and Kas-
46
vin; the Government of the Czar, however, gave assurances of
47
non-intervention which were acceptable to Sir Edward Grey.
The Shah, Mohammed iili» was soon forced to abdicate; his
son Ahmad Mirza was appointed Shah on July 18, 1909 with Azad-ul-
Mulk as Regent, A new electoral law had been proclaimed, and it
was hoped that order would be restored; elections were held and
on November 15 the new Mejlis assembled, iifter the new government
had come into power, Sir Edward Grey began to ask for the with-
48
drawal of Russian troops, whose presence in Persia he considered
no longer necessary. The number of troops was gradually reduced
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at Tabriz and Kasvin while those at .ardebil were to be with-
drawn.
In December the new government applied to the Russian
and British Legations for a loan of L 500,000, for which they would
be unable to give any security, air Edward Grey demanded at least
5E
a small security on the loan, while the Russian government pre-
ferred to advance Persia a large loan rather than the moderate one
she asked, so that England and Russia together would be rtin a posi-
tion to insist on the institution of an effective financial con-
53
trol." Finally on February 16, 1910, an Anglo-Russian loan of
L 400,000 was promised on condition that part of it be used to pro-
vide an armed force sufficient to protect commercial interests
in Persia, that seven French officials be employed in the Ministry
of Finance, and that Persia should grant no concessions for the con-
struction of railroads in Persia until the option had been of-
54
fered to the British or Russian Governments. The Persian ikiinister
of Finance would not even submit these conditions to the Mejlis
because he knew they would be rejected. It is apparent from these
49
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conditions made by Russia and England that they wanted a large
measure of control in the internal affairs of Persia as the price
55
of a paltry loan. Later Sir Edward Grey, in view of the need for
money in Persia, was willing to make an advance without any condi-
tions except for security and repayment, the money to be expended
for the restoration of order. This was to be voluntary on the
part of the two European Powers because they felt that Persia would
not apply to them, since the Persians were beginning to feel that
Russia and England were "scheming to put financial fetters on
56
Persia
By the middle of the year, 1910, the trade routes in
South Persia became so insecure and so harassed by robber bands
that Sir Edward Grey suggested that a formal protest be made by
the British and Russian Governments to the effect that unless order
was restored within a period of three months the British Government
would undertake it with a native oolice force commanded by British
57
officers of the Indian army. Finally, on October 14, 1910, a
58
note was sent to the Persian Government threatening intervention
within three months to make the roads safe in Southern Persia un-
less Persia did it herself. This note brought forth some comment
and protest by the outside world. The German papers saw in it a
55
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threat at the territorial integrity of Persia; they feared that the
shores of the Persian Gulf and the hinterland would fall under the
domination of the British. In short the partition of Persia was
59
feared. In the United States some feeling seems to have been
aroused Toy the oonduot of Persian affairs by the ixnglo-Russian
oo'dperation. In an editorial entitled "The Squeezing of Persia",
the Independent painted a picture of the hopeless condition Persia
was in; concerning the German view it sais: "Germany, of course,
sees in the British note only the consummation of the nefarious
bargain between Russia and Great Britain for the partition and
60
annexation of Persia."
While the Persian Government made some efforts to effect
plans for establishing order thruout the country, the situation
still remained critical. In November, the British officials found
61
it necessary to land troops at the southern ports. However, be-
fore the end of the year, conditions imnroved somewhat: robberies
62
almost entirely ceased and the roads seemed to be more secure.
That was the situation in Persia when the members of the Mejlis
were clamoring for the appointment of an American financial adviser.
59
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Chapter IV
SIR EDWaRD GREY* 3 ATTITUDE TOWARD W. MORGAN
SHUSTER 1 S ADMINISTRATION IN PERSIa, 1911.
In October, 1910, the Persian Parliament had expressed
1
itself in favor of securing an American as financial adviser.
Altho the Cabinet had opposed it at first and had favored the
appointment of a Frenchman, they were finally compelled to yield
to the request of the Mejlis. After some negotiation between the
Persian Legation at Washington and our State Department, I.
2
Morgan Shuster was selected for the position. He had been in
the Cuban customs service from 1898 to 1901, had been Insular
Collector of Customs at Manila from 1901 to 1906, and after that
service until 1909 was a member of the Philippine Commission. His
experience in finance had been wide and his training, thoro; above
all he was a man of ability and energy. Early in 1911, Mr. Shus-
ter with four assistants sailed for Persia where he arrived on
3
May 12.
Mr. Shuster immediately took up his work. The finances of Persia
were in disorder; there were no records of past revenues or ex-
The Americans were greeted warmly by the Persians, and
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penditures, no banking system, no cheok whatever on fraud; the
4
deficit in the treasury was about $500,000. About three weeks
after his arrival, Mr. Shuster presented to the Persian Government
the draft of a basic finance law establishing the office of Treas-
urer-General, and fixing his powers. This law passed the Mejlis
5
on June 13, by an almost unanimous vote. The act gave Mr. Shus-
ter wide powers in the matter of finance.
The new Treasurer-General, however, w&s destined to find
many difficulties ahead of him, in spite of the fact that he had
6
the confidence of the great majority of the Persian people. He
had gone to Persia with the idea that Persia was a free and in-
dependent nation, as had been recognized by the Anglo-Russian
Agreement, and that as an official of the Persian Government he
was responsible to Persia alone. He was soon to be disillusioned.
In his own story, Mr. Shuster said that from the very time the
employment of American officials was suggested, the Russian
Government had opposed the plan. After they had failed to in-
fluence the Persians and deter them from their purpose, "Russia
next approached the American State Department, which at that time
was in ignorance of the intentions of the Persian government, and
delicately suggested that it would be unwise or unkind to send
4
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5a
7
American finance experts to Persia.'* After the request was made,
Russia did not object openly.
It was not long until Mr. Shuster had a dispute with M,
Mornard, a Belgian official who had worked up to a responsible
position in the Persian customs service, M. Mornard announced that
the Belgian employees would not be subject to the ^merican Treas-
urer-General. By the middle of July, the affair was settled and
8
M. Mornard consented to obey the law. The British Government held
aloof from this quarrel. Thus far in Mr. Shuster's administration,
there had been no interference or hostility on the part of England.
Russia, on the other hand, seems to have opposed him, either openly
9
or secretly, from the very beginning.
At the time the difficulty with M. Mornard was being
settled, another question of more importance oame up» On July 6,
the Mejlis authorized Mr. Shuster to appoint an organizer for a
Treasury gendarmerie of 10,000 men; he immediately offered the pos-
10
it ion to Major Stokes, a British subject and an officer in the
Indian army, who had been a military attache" at the British Lega-
tion in Persia for several years. Major Stokes knew the country
7
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thoroly and was well acquainted with the language. He was willing
to accept the position provided the British Government would allow
him to resign his post.
It was on July 7, that Sir George Barclay, the British
Minister at Teheran, informed Sir Edward Grey of Mr. Shuster's
desire to secure Major Stokes 1 services. On July 10, Sir Edward
instructed Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at St.
Petersburg, to ask the views of the Russian Government on the
11 IE
appointment. The reply was that the noting Minister for For-
eign Affairs could see no objection to the gendarmerie, but if it
were necessary for the organization to be under the command of a
single officer, it would be better to select that officer from
among the minor Powers; but if the command could be split, he
thought that the posts might be filled by a Russian and a British
officer respectively. Mr. Shuster, however, insisted that Major
Stokes was the best man available for the position, and Sir George
Barclay felt sure that a Russian in addition to a British officer,
would not be accepted by the Persian Government except under cora-
13
pulsion. Finally, on July 21, Sir Edward Grey sent the following
14
telegram to the Minister at Teheran:
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"Before Major Stokes accepts command he will have to re-
sign his commission in the Indian army.
"You may tell Treasurer-General this."
Wvom this communication it would seem that at that time
Sir Edward had no special objection to the appointment of Major
Stokes even if Russia had made a contrary suggestion. But his con-
sent seemed to he given somewhat reluctantly, even at this time.
In the debate on Persian affairs on November 27, 1911, he ex-
plained that he afterward learned that Major Stokes had strong anti
15
Russian feelings.
A few days after this note had been sent, the Russian
Government began to fear that Major Stokes, in the capacity of
commander of the gendarmerie, might have to take part in military
operations in Persia, and perhaps against Russia. Sir Edward Grey
agreed that it was undesirable for him to engage in military oper-
16
at ions. Russia went further than simply to protest; she wanted
17
some appointment to counterbalance that of Major Stokes.
Because of the Russian objection which developed, Sir
18
Edward Grey, on august 1, assumed a different attitude; he not
only said that Major Stokes would have to resign his commission,
but he complained that the appointment had been made irrespective
15
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of the wishes of the British Government, "who would have preferred
to have been first consulted in the matter," and pointed out the
awkward situation whioh might result if there were any active
military operations. Before long he held that Major Stokes ought
not to be employed in Northern Persia, and said Russia had a right
19
to object. On August 18, Sir Edward said he would not accept the
20
resignation. The matter did not come up prominently again until
21
October 9, when the British Foreign Secretary telegraphed that
Major Stokes* appointment could not be approved unless the Russian
Government was satisfied; finally, on November 16, the resignation
22
was flatly refused. In giving this refusal, Sir Edward Grey
finally bowed to the demands of Russia, even after he had said,
or at least broadly implied, that this British officer could accept
the position if he resigned hi3 commission in the British army.
The next episode which aroused British and Russian dis
pleasure was the appointment of British subjects to Treasury posi-
tions at Ispahan, Shiraz, and Tabriz. There was not much objection
to the appointment of Mr. Haycock at Ispahan and Mr. Schindler at
Shiraz, since the former city was on the border of the Russian
23
sphere and the latter was in the neutral zone. But when Mr.
19
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Lecoffre was appointed at Tabriz, Sir Edward Grey immediately tele-
graphed that Russia would object, and that such an appointment
24
"would be contrary to the convention of 1907." In a dispatch,
dated November 10, he remarked that "it is probable that, if Shuster
were to cob'perate with the Russian Legation instead of working
25
against it, he would not find it obstructive." Four days later
26
he telegraphed to Mr. O'Beirne, the Charge1 dVffairs at St.
Petersburg, suggesting that the Russian Government "formulate their
complaints against Shuster and make a formal demand respecting
them."
A month before this last suggestion was made by Sir
Edward Grey, Mr. Shuster had gotten into trouble with the Russian
Consul-General over some property belonging to Shua-es-Sultaneh, a
27
prince of the royal house. The iiejlis had ordered the property
seized, and Mr. Shuster sent a small body of gendarmerie to take
possession, after he had notified the British and Russian Legations
of his intentions. They had made no protest. But after the Treas-
ury force had taken possession, the Russian Consul-General came with
24
Sessional Papers
,
1912-1913, Persia Ho. 4, [Cd. 6105]
CXXII, t>. 35, No. 82.
25
Ibid
. , p. 40, No. 95.
26
Ibid
. , p. 45, No. 109. Parliamentary Debates , Fifth
Series, Commons, XXXII, 154-155.
27
An account of this affair may be found in "Shuster 's
Own Story", Hearst's Magazine
,
April, 1912, pp. 2055-2056. Fort -
nightly Review
,
March, 1912, pp. 421-422; annual Register, 1911,
part I, p. 401.

57
some Russian guards and drove out the Persian detachment. The next
day, Mr. Shuster sent a larger force of one hundred men under two
Americans, who again took possession of the estate. Again the
Russian Consul-General appeared on the scene and objected. The
reason given for his interference was that the property had been
mortgaged to Russian subjects and that it was his duty to protect
Russian interests. The Russian Government demanded an apology for
this insult, as they considered it, and asked for the withdrawal
of the Treasury gendarmerie. The Russian demand does not appear
to be well founded; it seems to have been only an excuse for the
presentation of demands, the compliance with which would be a
humiliation to Persia. In the first place, the seizure of the
property by Mr. Shuster 1 s force occurred on October 9 and 10, but
the Russian formal protest and demand for an apology was not made
until November 2, almost a month later, further, Sir Edward Grey,
in his speech before the House of Commons on November 27, said that
as long as England was not interested, he would not enter "into
29
the merits of that dispute." In his dispatch to Mr. O'Beirne on
November 14, he said: "Russian complaints against Shuster' s action,
as reported in your telegram of yesterday, seem to be better found-
ed than dispute about Shua-es-Sultaneh 1 s property, as regards
which I am inclined, judging from the version of facts in my pos-
30
session, to consider that there has been some misunderstanding."
28
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Sir Edward considered Mr. Sinister' s appointment of Mr. Lecoffre as
Treasury agent at Tabriz more objectionable than the seizure of the
31
Prince's property. Sidney Low has said that the story of the
Russian Bank's lien on Shua-es-Sultaneh's property was a fiction in-
rented by the Russian Legation or the Russian Consulate-General
in Teheran, and the British Foreign Office accepted it. "Prince
Shua, before he left the country after his brother's expulsion,
executed a will according to the Persian custom, which showed that
the Russian Bank had no claim upon his estate." Mr. Low's informa-
tion may be questioned, but even if it is not reliable, the con-
trasting attitudes of the British and Russian Governments make the
whole affair seem questionable. The faot that Sir Edward- Grey did
not put much stock in the Russian side of it makes his policy the
more open to criticism. The episode was used as one of the reasons
for Russia's first ultimatum to Persia.
Russia sent her ultimatum to Persia on November 2, demand-
ing an apology for the seizure of the Persian Prince's property and
the alleged insult to the Russian Consul-General ; the withdrawal of
the Treasury gendarmerie was also asked. The apology must be made
by the Persian Minister for foreign Affairs in full uniform. The
Persian Government would not comply with these demands; on November
10, Russia gave the Persians forty-eight hours to give a satisfac-
32
tory reply. But no apology was made so Russia, on November 18,
31
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sent troops into Persia. Finally, on November 24, 1911, the Persian
Minister apologized, having "been pressed to do so "by the British
33
Government.
While these events were taking place, Mr. Shuster had
further incurred the displeasure of the Russian Government, who
were preparing additional demands against Persia. Sir Edward Grey
encouraged Russia to demand the dismissal of Mr. Shuster beoause he
had the audacity to defy the pleasure of the two Governments, who
considered their rights supreme in Persia, in the appointment of
Treasury agents. Mr. Shuster had thus far not heeded the protests
raised by the two Powers, especially those of Russia, against the
appointment of Mr. Leooffre at Tabriz. Furthermore, on October
21, Mr. Shuster, in a letter to the London Times had severely crit-
icised Russia, and at the same time had scored England, but not
34
so thoroly as he had Russia. Later this letter had been printed
in the Persian language in pamphlet form and scattered broadcast
thruout Persia. It was for these two reasons that Russia prepared
her new demands.
The Russian Government held Mr. Shuster responsible for
the circulation of this t>amphlet; they stated that he had caused it
35
to be printed and circulated. Sir Edward Grey took a very similar
33
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view, stating that as an American citizen Mr. Shuster had a right
to do it but as an official of Persia he did not. He said: "The
situation was an impossible one.... The situation is impossible if
you have the official of one Government making public attacks on
another Government, especially when it is an essential condition,
36
and must be an essential condition, of Persian independence." It
is only fair to state Mr. Shuster 's side of the story. He denied
having had the pamphlet printed, and said the charge was simply
false. tt It was well known to be false, --so well known, in fact,
that a newspaper in Teheran, the Tama dun , which did print it and
circulate it, publicly admitted the fact the minute they heard that
37
I was charged by Russia with having done so.* Lord Curzon
doubted if the statement published in the London Times was offic-
ially issued either by Mr. Shuster or the Persian Government to the
38
press of that country. While it is hardly probable that Mr.
Shuster "caused** the pamphlet to be printed and distributed, it
39
seems to have been done with his knowledge.
The second Russian ultimatum was presented to the Persian
40
Government on November 29, 1911. The demands were three;
36
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(1) that Mr, Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre should be dismissed; (2) that
the Persian Government should in its appointment of foreign ad-
visers consult the British and Russian Legations; and (3) that
Persia should pay an indemnity equal to the expenses of the military
expedition sent to Persia. Persia was given hut forty-eight hours
to reply. The Cabinet, which has been accused of being Russophile,
favored submission to the Russian terms; but the Mejlis would not
agree to terms which they considered disgraceful and humiliating.
On December 1, an hour before noon, when the Persian reply was due,
a decision had not been reached, a dramatic scene took place when
an aged priest arose and said: "It may be the will of Allah that
our liberty and our sovereignty shall be taken from us by force,
41
but let us not sign them away with our own hands.'" Similar
brief speeches were made; the vote was taken and the demands were
rejected by a vote that was almost unanimous. There were only six
42
votes in favor of accepting the demands.
This ultimatum was not entirely a Russian demand; the
British Government was as much responsible for it as the Government
of the Czar. In dispatches thruout Kovember, Sir Edward Grey had
said that he would not object to the demand for Mr, Shuster*
s
removal, nor could he see that the demand respecting the employment
of foreigners was objectionable. In short, the terms of the Russian
ultimatum had been submitted to Sir Edward before it ivas sent to
41
Hearst 's Magazine
,
May, 1912, p. 2239.
42
Sessional Papers
,
1912-1913, Persia Ho. 4, [Cd. 6105]
CXXII, pp. 91-93, Bo. 216.

62
Persia, and he had made no objection except in two details--he ob-
jected to the indemnity because Persia was short of money, and he
hoped that Russia would not allow the restoration of the deposed
43
Shah.
In the House of Commons on December 14, Sir Edward Grey
discussed these demands and gave his stand with regard to them and
the reasons for his attitude. The appointment of British subjects
at Ispahan, Shiraz and Tabriz had first aroused him. While the of-
ficial for Ispahan might meet with no objection from Russia, the
44
situation at Tabriz was different. He explained: "Tabriz is
close to the Russian frontier, and as soon as I heard of that, and
before the Russian Government had said a word about it, and for all
I know before they knew of it, I telegraphed to our Minister at
Teheran and pointed out to him that this sort of thing would not do,
that it was absolutely contrary to the iinglo-Russian agreement
.
11
The published dispatches seem to bear out this statement. Then on
November 6, before hearing from the Russian Government, he tele-
45
graphed to Teheran, and informed his Minister there that the
appointment of Mr. lecoffre was objectionable and instructed him
to point out to Mr. Shuster the probable consequences of such an
act. Mr. Shuster did not take the advice; for that reason, Sir
Edward Grey was not opposed to his dismissal from office.
43
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The British Foreign Secretary explained that the second
demand, namely, that Persia should appoint no foreign advisers
without British and Russian consent, was not an interference with
46
Persia's independence. It would he interfering if Russia de-
manded Anglo-Russian approval of Persian officials appointed to the
Persian Government. He said: "It does not touch the appointment of
Persian officials; it does touch, no doubt, the appointment of
foreign officials. Persia is weak and disorganized, and the very
fact that she requires foreign advisers shows that her independence
is not that same independence which can do without leaning on some-
47
one else." On November 24, Sir Edward Grey had notified Sir
48
George Buchanan that the demand was unobjectionable.
The third demand, that Persia pay an indemnity did not
meet with Sir Edward's approval, because, he said, "at the present
49
moment Persia cannot pay anything." iigain, the payment of an
indemnity by Persia at that time would be averse to British trade
interests. If Persia paid an indemnity she would be short of
money and unable to protect the southern trade routes thru lack
of funds. It is apparent that his opposition to this third demand
was not actuated by any altruistic motives.
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While Sir Edward Grey was willing to see these demands
presented to Persia, and allow Russian troops to invade Iran to en-
force the demands, he desired an explicit understanding with Hussia
regarding the future. Therefore, he put his ideas on record in
the following six points, which were forwarded to the Russian
50
Government^
*1« I recognize that the outcome of the present situation
must be to secure a Persian Government that will not disregard the
special interests of Great Britain and Russia respectively and will
conform to the principles of the Anglo-Russian Agreement.
nZ. The restoration of the ex-Shah cannot be essential to
this object. It will give use to the apprehension of vindictive
measures on his part against those in Persia, who were instrumental
in expelling him, and it would not be consistent with our dignity
to recognize him now after his recent disregard of warnings given
by both Governments not to return. I trust, therefore, the Russian
Government will not add to the embarassment of the situation by al-
lowing his restoration to be the outcome of the present crisis.
*3. It is most important that Mr. Shuster shall be suc-
ceeded without delay by some foreign financial adviser who is
acceptable to both Great Britain and Russia.
*4. The British and Russian Governments should, when
the Russian demands have been conceded, cooperate in facilitating
measures such as a loan necessary to prevent chaos and to enable
50
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the Persian Government to restore order.
*5. The exaction of an indemnity by Russia would mater-
ially interfere with this object, and I trust the Russian Govern-
ment will, after the crisis is over, find some way of avoiding this
difficulty.
**6. It is understood that military measures and the oc-
cupation of Persian territory by Russia now in progress, are pro-
visional and not permanent and will cease when the Russian demands
have been complied with, and order in Northern Persia is re-estab-
lished. 1*
The Russian Government gave him no immediate satisfaction
on all six of these points, but the provisions seem to have been fol-
lowed to some extent. The Persian Government, early in 1912, was
51
forced to recognize the provisions of the Anglo-Russian agreement.
52
Russia would not agree to oppose the restoration of the ex-Shah,
but as he did not come into power again there was no cause for a
misunderstanding. Mr. Shuster was successfully expelled and Eng-
53
land and Russia agreed upon M. Mornard as financial adviser.
Russia still pressed Persia for an indemnity, in spite of Sir Ed-
54
ward Grey's protest, and Persia finally agreed to the Russian terms.
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.Finally, the Russien troops were never entirely withdrawn from
Persia; there were withdrawals from some places, but Russia still
had an army occupying a large part of Northern Persia when the
Great War broke out. Sir Edward Grey protested against their
presence in Persia and pleaded for their withdrawal time and time
again, but to no avail. Sir Edward went no further, however, than
to protest.
From the time that the Russian demands were rejected by
the Mejlis on December 1, 1911, until the beginning of the new year,
many changes took place in Persia. The Mejlis still continued to
meet. Russian troops penetrated further and further into Persian
55
territory. On December 4, Mr. Shuster tried to remedy matters
by revoking the appointments of Messrs. Lecoffre, Haycock and
Schindler. Persia attempted to influence Russia to modify the de-
57
mands, but with no success. On December 18, an attempt was made
to get the Mejlis to agree to proposals empowering the Cabinet
58
to settle the dispute with Russia but the Mejlis refused. Three
days later, however, the assembly appointed a committee to assist
the Cabinet in the settlement and no further reference of the
affair was to be made to Parliament. The next day, the Persian
Government verbally accepted the Russian demands; the Russian
55
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Minister at Teheran declared that the reply was acceptable to his
59
Government. The same day the Mejlis was dissolved "by the Regent,
The Shuster affair called forth considerable comment thru-
out the world. It is interesting to note the reactions of the dif-
ferent countries. In the Russian papers, Mr. Shuster was referred
to as an "American freebooter,'* and an "insolent American adventur-
60
er in a pea-jacket and a paper collar.'* The Persians seem "to
have trusted him, and his influence over the Mejlis was remarkable.
Americans admired the courage he displayed in opposing Russia's
demands. In England, Mr, Shuster had many friends and admirers.
Mr. Sidney Low said his "real crime in the eyes of Russia was that
he was too energetic in the discharge of his duties, and was getting
the Persian finances and administration into order inconveniently
61
fast.'* After his expulsion from Persia, Mr. Shuster visited
England and was warmly received. He made a good impression there;
even the London Times had a good word for him.
The policy Sir Edv^ard Grey pursued during the time Mr.
Shuster was Treasurer-General in Persia, was severely criticised
on all sides. The fact that he supported the Russian ultimatum of
November 29, was criticised by many. The following statement from
59
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the London Economist makes that point: "The discovery that Sir
Edward Grey on his own avowal was actually supporting the Russian
ultimatum to Persia--in open violation of the Anglo-Russian Agree-
ment as well as the obvious detriment of British and Indian interests
--gave an ugly shock to public opinion.'* Mr. Philip Morrell voiced
the same sentiment in an article in the nineteenth Century and f-
64
ter . The London Ifat ion was hostile and extremely critical toward
the Government's policy of 1911.
Many of the speeches made in Parliament on November 27,
64
and December 14, when the Government's foreign policy was dis-
cussed, were critical and bitter. The Earl of Ronaldshay said:
"When I view the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to
Persia during recent years, I oannot think that its aotion has been
65
particularly happy." Lord Curzon was opposed to the Government's
66
stand in the Shuster affair, he was afraid the independence of
Persia was not being protected, and he said Russia had no just
reason for sending the second ultimatum. Mr. Keir Hardie said that
England and Russia had agreed to cooperate in maintaining the in-
dependence and integrity of Persia, but "from then up till now the
chief object of both countries seems to have been to devise ways
62
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and means as well as excuses for invasions of Persian territory and
67
the destruction of the powers of its rulers.'* Some speakers
oritioised the landing and the use of British troops in South
Persia during 1910 and 1911.
Those who defended Sir Edward Grey's Persian policy
usually viewed it in connection with his foreign policy in general.
Then it could he justified. Sir Henry Dalziel said: "He, at all
events, has something to lay to his claim, and which I think ought
to commend him to his Radical supporters: that during his period of
office he has kept us out of war, and, I believe, maintained the
68
dignity and the power of this country.'* In an editorial, the
69
Outlook pointed out that the British policy was not dictated by
antagonism to Mr. Shuster, but rather by a desire to keep the friend-i
ship of her ally, Russia, at a time "when the attitude of Germany
made England desirous of keeping all her friends in Europe." Sir
Edward Grey, himself, admitted that Mr. Shuster was a man of ability
and good intentions, but that he lacked tact. Hearly all who
criticised the administration of the Treasurer-General praised his
honesty, integrity and zeal, but criticised him for the way in
which he refused to recognize itnglo-Hussian interests in Persia.
Sir Edward Grey's "weak policy" of 1911, in Persia was
67
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closely conneoted with his whole foreign policy; it was a part of
his entire policy; it was European as well as Asiatic. Mr. Ponsonby
70
made a statement which throws some light on the underlying cause
of the English Government's policy during this period. He said:
"We find ourselves in Persia submitting tamely to the dictation of
the Russian Government. The man in the street sees Russian troops
being poured into Persia, and understands that we make no protest.
He sees Italy seize Tripoli at forty-eight hour's notice, and we
make no protest. He hears of French troops entering Fez, and we
make no protest. But immediately a German man-of-war goes to
Agadir we are told that we are on the eve of a very great crisis."
He explained that the principle at the bottom of all this was the
attempt to keep the balance of power.
It was in 1911, that the Agadir incident occurred and in
this crisis England supported France against Germany. The dispute
lasted from July until November, the time being practically the same
as the period of opposition to Mr. Shuster in Persia. Russia had
no part in this affair; she did not have to fear Germany as did
England and France; her hands were free to exert pressure in Persian
affairs.
Furthermore, Russia had become more friendly toward
Germany in 1910 and 1911, so it was to England's advantage, as far
as the situation in Europe was concerned, to try to keep on good
terms with the Czar. If England lost the good will of Russia, the
70
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latter could easily ally herself with Germany. England feared that
very thing might happen, so in the Moroooo crisis the British
Government had to yield somewhat to Russia in order to keep her
from going over to the side of Germany.
The British Government's fear in this instance was well-
founded. In November, 1910, Czar Nicholas visited the Kaiser at
Potsdam. Here the two monarchs exchanged views on affairs and it
was thought that they arranged an agreement. This meeting weakened
the Triple Entente, and as a result of it Germany began to threaten
the British supremacy on the Persian Gulf, This rapprochement was
supplemented by the Agreement relating to Persia signed by Germany
71
and Russia at St. Petersburg, august 19, 1911. In this document,
Germany agreed not to seek concessions in the Russian sphere of
influence in Persia; on her part, Russia agreed to try to obtain a
concession from the Persian Government for the construction of a
railroad from Teheran to Khanikin, which was to connect with a
branch of the Bagdad Railway. This concession must be obtained by
Russia within two years after the Sadi jeh-Khanikin branch of the
Bagdad Railway was completed. If the Persian concession was not
secured in this time, Russia should renounce the right to such a
concession and the German Government should have "the right to
solicit on its part the concession of said line. 1* There were minor
stipulations concerning duties, customs, finance, and other regula-
tions. This Agreement not only brought Russia and Germany more
71
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closely together, but it gave Germany an entering wedge in Persian
affairs. No wonder England did not want to provoke Russia in the
Morocco crisis in whish the British were so openly hostile toward
Germany, There was real danger of a combination by Germany and
Russia which might be detrimental to Great Britain.
Sir Edw&rd Grey felt the gravity of the situation. On
72
January 20, 1912, in a speech to his constituents, he replied to
some of the criticisms of those who wanted intervention in Central
Asia and differences with Russia. By such an act, he said, "you
are going to incur, not only the very heavy naval expenditure which
we have all ready, but a vastly increased military expenditure as
well. 1* If England were to have differences with Russia, she would
incur the hostility of Prance; the alliance between Prance and
Russia was too solid not to make both the enemies of Great Britain
in case of an Anglo-Russian dispute. Sir Edward believed that such
a policy, "if it were carried out, would soon leave us without a
friend in Europe." Mr. Shuster ventured the view that England
did not have a large enough land force to risk a stand against
73
Russia.
It is true that the Persian policy of the British Govern-
ment during Mr. Shuster 's stay in Persia does not reflect any
credit on the British Poreign Secretary; but before condemning his
attitude, the Persian crisis must be given its place in the larger
72
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general policy of England during the year, 1911, and considered as
a part of this larger policy. Prom Sir Edward Grey's protest
against Russia's demand for an indemnity from Persia, and his re-
peated requests for the recall of the Russian troops, it is appar-
ent that the situation in Persia was not satisfactory to him and
not as he would have it. To retain Russia's good will and keep
intact the Triple Entente, it seemed the part of wisdom to bow to
Russia and help dictate terms to Persia. It is regrettable, how-
ever, that a man like Mr. Shuster, who had accomplished so much in
so short a time in reforming Persian finance, should be made to
suffer, simply for the convenience of Russia and Great Britain.

Chapter V
ENGLISH AH3) RUSSLdH COHTROL III PERSIA, 1912-1914.
The first few months of 1912 were taken up for the most
part in negotiations between the two Powers and Persia concerning
some of the demands included in Sir Edward Grey's six points to
Russia.
In the first place, a successor to Mr. Shuster had to he
found. The deposed American Treasurer-General left Teneran on
1
January 11, 1912. few days earlier, M. Llornard had been appoint-
ed acting Treasurer-General, and he was spoken of by U, Sazonof as
the logical man to fill tne position permanently because of his
2
business experience and his thoro knowledge of Persian affairs.
Sir George Barclay had earlier spoken of m. Mornard to Sir Edward
3
Grey in the following fashion: **I have always found him satisfac-
tory, and I think that in view of his long experience of Persia
and of the harmonious manner in which he has hitherto worked with
the two legations, his appointment would be the most practical in
the circumstances.** Accordingly, Mr. Mornard was duly appointed
to take the post on June 10, 1912, by a decree of the Council of
1
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4
Ministers; his contract was for five years.
The question of a loan to Persia next came up. The two
Governments were agreed that Persia needed financial assistance,
and the British Government felt that it was needed immediately to
restore order. Sir Edward Grey was willing to advance L 100,000 to
start with. On February IS, he instructed the British Minister at
5
Teheran to advance the English share whenever he saw fit. But on
February 18, a joint note was sent to the Persian Government by
the British and Russian Ministers stating the terms on which the
6
British and Russian banks would advance the money. The most im-
portant of these conditions was that the Persian Government "con-
form their policy henceforth to the principles of the ^nglo-Rus-
sian Convention of 1907. n The Persians hesitated; they suggested
an alternate wording of their agreement to conform to the Conven-
tion and after some discussion and negotiation between the three
Governments a suitable wording of Persia 1 s submission was arrived
7
at. On March 20, the Persian answer was received at the British
Legation, stating Persia's acquiescence quite humbly: n In order to
prove their earnest desire to establish on a solid basis of friend-
ship and confidence the relations between Persia, Great Britain,
4
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and Russia, the Persian Government will take care to conform their
policy with the principles of the convention of 1907, and they take
note of the assurances contained in the preamble of that conven-
8
tion." Shortly after the Persian Government gave their satisfactory
reply to the Anglo-Russian demands, the British share of the ad-
vance, L 100,000, was paid.
During the Persian crisis of 1911, a considerable number
of troops had been sent to Persia, In December of 1911, and Jan-
uary of 191&, the Russians had resorted to severe measures in some
9
of the northern cities in Persia, especially Tabriz and Resht.
It was alleged that attacks had been made by the Persian populace
on the Russian soldiers who were occupying those cities, -a. number
10
of these Persian citizens were court-martialed and executed. While
England made no protest against the actions of the Russian troops,
yet as things began to calm down, Sir Edward Grey began to urge the
withdrawal of these troops.
The amount of control the British and Russian Governments
had during this period over appointments was very great. When a
successor to Yeprim Khan, as chief of police in Teheran, was talked
of on June 7, 1912, the Regent, Hasr-ul-Mulk, consulted the I&inis-
8
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ters at Teheran, Sir Walter Townley and M. Poklewsky, to ascertain
the views of the two Governments in the matter since it was desir-
11
able that the place should be filled by a foreigner. A Swedish
officer was suggested to fill the vacancy, .about two months later,
Sir Walter Townley criticised the Persian Minister for .Foreign
affairs for not consulting the two legations before requesting the
IE
Swedish Government to furnish police officers, and the same criti-
cism was repeated ten days later when the Persian Government with-
out referring the matter to the British and Russians, approached
the Dutch Minister about officers to organize a small Persian
13
army.
On *pril 20
»
1912
»
in spite of the fact that a loan of
i 200,000 had shortly before been made to Persia by the two Govern-
ments, the acting Treasurer-General made a request for a further
advance, as the money on hand would be exhausted by the end of the
14
month. Sir Edward Grey favored another advance; the Russian
Government at first refused, but later M. Sazonof favored a large
loan of L 6,000,000, but demanded a concession from Persia for the
building of a railway from Julfa to Tabriz by Russia as a condition
to this loan. As the Persian Government was reluctant to grant
such a concession, the negotiations for a joint loan extended until
11
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early in 1913; Sir Edward Grey also asked for a railway concession
as one of the terms for the British share, this railroad to be built
15
from Mohammerah to Khoremabad. In the meantime, however, Sir Ed-
ward authorized his Minister at Teheran to advance, from time to
time, small amounts of from h 6,000 to L 10,000 to the Governor-
General of Pars to he used for the maintenance of a native Persian
gendarmerie for the purpose of keeping the roads and trade-routes
16
safe and open for travel. The Russian concession was finally
17
signed on February 6, 1915, and the Russian Government agreed to
an advance of £ 200,000. The British were willing to do the same
hut Sir Edward Grey was very much surprised and chagrined at the
lb
"inequality of the treatment" given the two Powers. He regretted
very much that the Mohammerah concession had not been granted, too,
"in view of the great forbearance shown by His Majesty's Government
19
to the Persian Government." Later Persia granted the concession.
In spite of Sir Edward Grey's cooperation with Russia in
pressing demands on Russia, some of his dispatches show that he
still desired to maintain the independence of Persia. In December,
1912, Captain Eckford and a party of British had been attacked by
15
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Persian tribesmen and the Gaptain had been killed. Sir Walter
Tounley had recommended that in case the Persian Government was
unable to punish the culprits an expedition of British troops should
be sent to southern Persia to exact reparation. Sir Edward replied
that the plan was open to grave objections. In his reply on Jan-
uary 11, 1913, he said: "I am strongly opposed to such a policy.
I do not think there is sufficient ground at present for giving up
hope of maintaining the independence of Persia. It would, I think,
be more in accordance both with our interests as well as with under-
takings which have been given, to direct all our efforts towards
establishing a strong Government in Persia, and assisting the
20
gendarmerie to perform its duties in a really efficient manner."
In September, 1912, when Sir Edward Grey and M. Sazonof
21
met at Balmoral Castle, the former pointed out the fact that the
Russian sphere of influence was much larger than the British sphere,
and complained that the people of England felt that the changes
since the Anglo-Russian Convention had been to their disadvantage.
He pointed out the predominance of Russian influence in northern
Persia, and for that reason England should be sure of the Russian
attitude toward the rest of the country. Sir Edward trusted the
attitude of IvI. Poklewsky in Persian affairs. M. Sazonof assured
him that whatever Russian Minister was at Teheran, his instinct ions
20
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would always be the same. Alt ho it was generally expected that
the Convention of 1907 would he revised at this meeting, nothing
apparently was done about it. In spite of Sir Edward Grey's pro-
test, the Russian and British spheres remained the same.
Sir Edward Prey's attitude in Persian affairs during the
years 1912-1914 is nowhere better summed up in his dispatches than
in a few sent in November 1912. In a telegraphic dispatch to Sir
22
George Buchanan dated November 20, he said:
"The only justification for the action which we have
taken with a view to the appointment of Saad-ed-Lowleh as Prime
Minister is the fact that money is absolutely necessary to the
Persian Government, and that no other appointment appears to be
possible which will enable the two Governments to make an advance
to be followed by a larger loan by financiers.
"The concession for the Julfa Railway is, we gather,
required by the Eussian Government as a condition prior to the
grant of any advance. His Majesty's Government expect that the
concession for the Mohammerah Railway will at the same time be
given to this country.
"If, therefore, these two concessions are granted by
Saad, I understand that the Russian and British Governments will
either guarantee or themselves make an advance up to L 1,000,000,
subject to proper conditions, for certain specified purposes.
"The two Governments should also, I think, support
Saad's views as to the convocation of a Mejlis and the foundation
of a Senate [which Sir Walter Townley had said the Persian politi-
cians favored].
"I wish to know whether the above views are fully shared
by the Russian Government. If so, we will instruct His Majesty's
Ambassador at Paris to join with his Russian colleague in request-
ing the Regent to appoint Saad-ed-Dowleh Priae Minister."
After receiving evasive replies from the Russian Foreign
Minister, Sir Edward began to get out of patience with the Russian
22
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methods. On Llovember 25, he telegraphed the following spirited note
23
to the British Ambassador at St* Petersburg:
"I trust that Minister for Foreign Affairs fully realizes
that it is impossible for anyone to carry on the Government unless
some funds are at once supplied to him for essential purposes of
creating a stable administration and for reestablishing order in the
provinces. These are absolutely necessary preliminaries to a larger
loan-- we could not press for the appointment of any one as Prime
Minister unless we could be assure him that the immediate wants of
the Treasury would be met, under, of course, proper safeguards,
and I much fear that the general chaotic situation in Persia will
be aggravated if the present deplorable condition of affairs is
allowed to continue. I earnestly trust that the Russian Government
will find some means of meeting, in the way his Majesty's Govern-
ment have proposed, the pressing exigencies of a disquieting sit-
uation .
"
In spite of Sir Edward Grey's favorable attitude toward
Persian independence, he had found it necessary thruout 1911, and
1912, to keep British forces in Persia because of the state of
anarchy in the south. Order was maintained in the Gulf ports by
the presence there of the British East Indian squadron; it had also
been necessary to land Indian troops at Lingah to protect the
Consulate and British lives and property. Later a force of blue-
jackets had to be landed at Bushire to help fight the rebels who
were besieging the town. A detachment of the Central India Horse
24
was also stationed at Shiraz. In 1913, the Persian gendarmerie
was strengthened and better organized by Swedish officers; so in
April, the 3ritish Indian troops were withdrawn from Shiraz and
23
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25
replaced by a gendarmerie detachment. The gendarmerie force was
used in subduing the Boer Ahmadi rebels who were responsible for
the murder of Captain Eckford. These troops were used in patrolling
the roads and dealing with the robber bands that infested them.
The trade-routes were made so much more safe that British trade
26
increased greatly in 1913 and 1914. The successful organization,
of this native gendarmerie was, to a great extent, due to the
efforts of Sir Edward 3rey in pushing the Anglo-Russian loan of
1913, and advancing smaller amounts from time to time for the or-
ganization of this force.
Thus from 1912 to 1914, Russia and Jreat Britain exerted
a great deal of influence in Persia, and actually controlled af-
fairs to a greater or less degree. This Anglo-Russian control was
both political and military. The British policy, however, was much
more liberal than the Russian. Sir Edward Orey wished to respect
Persian independence, in a limited sense at least, and favored an
advance of money at intervals in order to enable Persia to restore
order and strengthen her Government. He did not keep British
troops in South Persia any longer than was necessary and continually
requested Russia to withdraw hers.
By the time the ireat European War broke out in 1914,
Persia had restored order somewhat under British and Russian in-
27
fluence. But there was still much to be done. There were, how-
25
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ever, no aggressive moves on the part of the two Powers after the
events of the Shuster episode and the arrangements immediately
following. On July 21, 1914, Ahmad Mirza, having reached his six-
teenth year and having become of age according to the Persian law,
was crowned and took the oath of fidelity to the Constitution. Ee
was immediately recognized by the British and Russian Governments.
Within the next few days, affairs in Europe had come to a crisis;
the Great European tfar claimed the attention of the diplomats, so
Persia was left in the background for a time.

CONCLUSION
Sir Edward Jrey*s Persian policy has "been the object of
bitter disapproval at the hands of many critics, as Professor Ed-
ward G. Browne, who could see nothing in the Anglo-Russian Agree-
ment but an arbitrary division of Persia by two outside powers who
had no right, either moral or political, to make such a partition.
To this class of critics the Convention of 1907 was a cheat and a
delusion, and the policy pursued by the two Powers after the sign-
ing of the Agreement until 1914 was detrimental to the independenc
and integrity of Persia, which Sir Edward Jrey and M. Isvolsky had
pledged to respect. Another group stoutly defended the policy of
the British Foreign Secretary, and some, a3 Professor Jilbert
Murray, were outspoken in its praise. To judge impartially oi the
merits and the demerits of Sir Edward 1 s conduct of Persian affairs
is rather difficult.
In the first place the Anglo-Russian Agreement fell far
short of being the success it was hoped it would be, -at least so
far as England was concerned. At the most, it only secured Russia
half-hearted friendship; the good feeling between the two nations
was not deep and lasting. The difference in the national outlook
of the two countries could not permit that; this difference is
shown by Sir Edward Jrey's restrained policy in Persia and the ag-
gressive policy of Russia. Sir Edward himself admitted that the
Agreement had not been absolutely fair, when he complained that
Russia had received a much larger sphere than England; this admis-
sion demonstrated that he had overemphasized the strategic value
of the pact at the time it was signed. Russia's interpretation of
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the Agreement had opened his eyes, we may believe, to the fact that
the Jovernment of the Czar was pursuing an aggressive policy with
England's approval, or, at least, forbearance.
Sir Edward Jrey's approval of the Russian demands in 1911
lost for him most of the good will the Persians still reposed in
him as their champion against the power of Russia, and alienated
from the group of his admirers a large number of liberal-minded
people, not only in England, but in America as well. We must
remember, however, that Sir Edward was in a very difficult posi-
tion in 1911; the Morocco crisis developed at the same time.
On account of the agreement between Russia and Germany, the former
had to be treated with some deference and tact.
Yet, while cooperating with Russia in the expulsion of
Mr. Shuster, Sir Edward had, both before and after that crisis,
consistently protested against the large number of Russian troops
in Northern Persia. Eis use of English troops in Persia was
liberal when compared with the conduct of the Russian forces. If
intervention can in any case be justified, Sir Edward's use of
the British troops in South Persia was above reproach, for they
were withdrawn as soon as order was restored. The British Secre-
tary's attitude toward the Persian Constitution was liberal; he
favored the meetings of the Llejlis. He was always ready to ad-
vance a loan to Persia when the need was great; that cannot be
said of Russia.
It is hard to believe that Sir Edward Jrey aimed to de-
prive Persia of her independence when he negotiated the Anglo-
Russian Agreement; he really meant to respect the integrity and
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independence of Persia as the Convention purported to do. But
European complications arose, and in his attempt to maintain the
"balance of power, to keep the Triple Entente intact, and retain the
friendship of Russia, Sir Edward had to sacrifice his ideals with
regard to Persian affairs. He could not risk a misunderstanding
or a war with the Government of the Czar. Sir Edward's Persian
policy during 1911 and 1912 was termed a "weak policy" more than
once, hut viewed in the light of suDsequent events it would seem
that he made the right decision. The European War proved the
value of holding the Triple Entente together. Altho Russia's part
in the War was a failure, the hordes that she put in the field en-
gaged large forces of the Central Powers that would otherwise
have "been thrown against the Allies in the We3t . Altho there were
factors, other than the entente between Ireat Britain, France and
Russia, that would have caused Russia to cast her lot with the
Allies, the fact that England and Russia knew how to cobperate
cannot be disregarded. Perhaps Russia's friendship was worth
the price. Men with high ideals in world affairs have pointed out
the international immorality of Sir Edward Jrey ' s P ersian policy,
hut viewed according to the standards of the diplomacy of the per-
iod and the bargaining since the ireat War, his attitude cannot
"be severely criticised.
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